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Abstract
The performance of services sectors can have significant impacts on industries that use ser-
vices as intermediate inputs. In this paper we complement the literature analyzing the pro-
ductivity eﬀects of services trade policies by investigating the relationship between services
policy reforms and employment in manufacturing industries. Using a panel of sector-level
data for 24 transition economies for the 1990-2012 period, we find find that moving to-
wards best practice services policies is associated with an economically significant reduction
of manufacturing employment. This negative eﬀect is mitigated or disappears for countries
with high levels of economic governance and human capital. The decline in manufacturing
employment is observed only in the first decade of transition, with the major driver be-
ing reforms in the utilities sector. The estimated negative eﬀect of policy reforms is of a
contemporaneous nature; it does not persist along the lag structure.
Keywords: services policy; employment; transition economies
JEL Classification: F16; F66; J23; P21
1 Introduction
The role of services in economic development has been attracting increasing attention. Examples
include recent eﬀorts to measure the share of value-added in traded goods that reflects embed-
ded services, analysis of the trend towards servicification (manufacturing firms shifting to selling
services as well as goods), and research on the determinants of structural transformation (the
movement of workers and other factors of production from low to higher productivity activi-
ties). Structural transformation is usually characterized by an initial shift out of agriculture
(employment in rural areas) into manufacturing (employment in urban areas), accompanied by a
∗The authors are grateful to Andrea Ariu, Giuseppe Berlinghieri, Cosimo Beverelli, Francesco Bripi and
Emmanuel Milet for helpful comments and conversations. We also thank participants at the Second Biennial
conference on Empirical Investigations in Services Trade held at the EUI in June 2016. The views expressed here
are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Banque de France or the Eurosystem.
†Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (European University Insti-
tute). E-mail: matteo.fiorini@eui.eu.
‡Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and CEPR.
§Banque de France.
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steady rise in the share of output and employment in services reflecting high income elasticities
of demand for many services and a presumption that the productivity growth potential of many
services sectors is limited.
A rapidly growing strand of the literature on services is concerned with the aggregate productivity
effects of service sector performance. This has shown that services performance matters for
firm-level competitiveness (productivity) in all sectors because many services are inputs into
production, and many firms rely increasingly on a wide variety of service inputs that are sourced
from outside suppliers. Of particular interest has been to better understand the effects of services
policies on economic performance. There have been numerous empirical papers analyzing how
services impact on economic performance and the effect of trade and other policies targeting
service sectors on downstream productivity and/or export performance.1
Limited attention has been given to empirical assessment of how (changes in) services trade
and investment and related regulatory policies impact on employment in manufacturing sectors.
This paper seeks to partially fill this gap with a focus on the experience of transition economies,
thereby contributing to the literature on structural transformation and to the analysis of the
effects of service sector policies. The paper complements the extant literature on productivity
effects of services policies as well as studies of the employment effects of services offshoring. The
latter strand of the literature identifies different theoretical channels with ambiguous predictions
regarding the effects of services offshoring on employment. On the one hand, offshoring lowers
input prices and increases profits, in turn potentially increasing manufacturing production and
labor demand. On the other hand, higher quality and cheaper service inputs may substitute for
labor used in production, leading to a decrease in labor demand (Amiti and Wei, 2006; Milberg
and Winkler, 2010b and Winkler, 2010).
Consistent with the theoretical ambiguity, the results of empirical analyses are mixed. Amiti
and Wei (2005) find a positive correlation between services offshoring and employment in the
UK between 1995 and 2001. Focusing on US sector-level data Amiti and Wei (2006) identify
a negative effect of services offshoring on employment, using disaggregated data (450 sectors).
This negative impact vanishes if a less disaggregated sector classification is used, suggesting that
there is sufficient growth in labor demand in sub-sectors within these broader categories to offset
the negative effect. In the case of Germany Schöller (2007) finds a negative impact of services
offshoring on low-skilled labor in manufacturing sectors for the 1991-2000 period, as does Winkler
(2010) for the period 1995-2006. Milberg and Winkler (2010a) and Milberg and Winkler (2015)
extend this analysis to multi-country samples of OECD countries and show that negative impacts
are attenuated by the existence of labor market institutions that reduce economic insecurity.2
In this paper we build on this literature to assess the effects of services-related policies on
manufacturing employment for a panel of transition economies. Rather than focus on the impact
1 Firm-level analyses of productivity effects include Arnold et al. (2008, 2011); Fernandes and Paunov (2011);
Forlani (2012); Duggan et al. (2013); Bas (2014); Hoekman and Shepherd (2015) and Arnold et al. (2016). Studies
using sector-level data include Barone and Cingano (2011); Bourlès et al. (2013) and Beverelli et al. (2015).
2 Other research on the effect of services offshoring on productivity includes Görg and Hanley (2003) and
Görg et al. (2008) working with plant-level data. Wright (2014) provides a theoretical analysis of the effect of
(non services-specific) offshoring on employment. The structure and predictions of the model are in line with the
services-specific mechanisms in the papers discussed in the text.
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of specific decisions by firms (offshoring), our interest is in the effects of services policies. In
addition to analyzing the effects of services reforms, we extend the analysis of Milberg and
Winkler (2010a) and Milberg andWinkler (2015) by investigating the role of economic governance
(rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory quality) in moderating the employment effects
of services policy reforms. We argue that the quality of economic governance, as opposed to
more narrow measures of employment protection used in the offshoring literature, may shape
the effect of services policy reforms by affecting incentives to invest and expand manufacturing
output.
Our study also adds to the broader literature on the effect of reforms in transition economies
and the question whether countries that pursued deeper reforms performed better than average.
Studies on this subject mostly span country-level analysis, with mixed results regarding the effect
of reforms on economic growth (see for instance the survey of empirical evidence in Falcetti et al.,
2006). We make two contributions. First, in assessing the impacts of reforms we take into account
differences in the intensity of use of different types of services inputs. Second, because we are able
to exploit the heterogeneity across manufacturing industries, our empirical specification allows
estimation under weaker identifying assumptions than most previous studies through country-
year fixed effects. This mitigates potential endogeneity problems that may arise, e.g., if reform
implementation is a function of the state of the overall economy.
2 Services reforms and employment in manufacturing
The services reforms that are the focus of analysis in what follows are pro-competitive in nature,
comprising reductions in restrictions on international trade and inward foreign direct investment
(FDI), the removal of barriers to entry for private firms and more generally the introduction of
commercial freedoms, and actions to establish or strengthen regulatory regimes and implement-
ing institutions. The policy indicators we use have been developed by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and measure the distance between prevailing policies
in a given year with what is deemed to constitute good (best) practice. They are unique in being
available on an annual basis starting in 1990.3
Other things equal, movement in the direction of better economic governance and regulatory
practices is expected to result in lower prices, higher quality and/or greater variety in the avail-
ability of producer services. Assuming this is the case, reforms may impact on manufacturing
employment through different potential channels. Improved access to cheaper or higher quality
services inputs may increase profits. Higher profit margins, in turn, may result in an expansion in
the scale of production, through lower output prices or higher investment. Such a price-induced
positive scale effect is likely to be associated with an increase in labor demand of the downstream
sectors.
Alternatively, access to more efficient and technologically-advanced producer services may permit
specialization by manufacturing firms in core activities. This may lead to an expansion of
3 A detailed description of the sector-specific policy and institutional indicators reported in the EBRD Tran-
sition Indicators Database is provided in Appendix C.
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manufacturing production, but have ambiguous effects on manufacturing employment. Greater
output may require more production workers, but if greater specialization entails outsourcing of
non-core services activities, overall employment in manufacturing may decline. In this case there
will be a reallocation of services workers across sectors, with ambiguous results as far as overall
employment in downstream manufacturing industries is concerned.4 Reforms that involve the
removal of services trade barriers may also lead to services offshoring in addition to domestic
outsourcing. If so, there might be direct replacement of domestic workers providing services
(whether in-house or by specialized services firms) by more efficient or less expensive foreign
workers employed abroad.5 The upshot is that the net effect on manufacturing employment is
unclear.
An additional complication that is specific to the transition context is that in the early years of
economic reform changes in policies that led to hard budget constraints and cost-reflective price-
setting could lead to increases in prices of services inputs. If price controls and more generally
non-market-based allocation of resources under central planning led to under-pricing of services
inputs, the transition process will lead to increasing prices for such inputs to reflect their real
market value. This was the case for energy services in many transition economies, which often
was effectively subsidized for major manufacturing industries under central planning. Insofar as
the initial years of transition were accompanied by increases in input costs for manufacturing
industries that could not be passed on to customers, policy reforms would tend to increase costs,
with a negative effect on output and employment. Moreover, pro-competitive reforms had the
effect of disrupting long-established supply networks and contractual relationships between man-
ufacturing plants and their suppliers (Roland and Verdier, 1999) reducing the contemporaneous
efficiency gains of reforms. There are of course other transition-specific factors as well, including
political economy forces, see for example BenYishay and Grosjean (2014).
We abstract from the specific dimensions of the transition process in this paper. What matters
for our analysis is that there are idiosyncratic factors that influence the employment effects
of policy reforms undertaken in our sample of Eastern European and Central Asian (EECA)
transition economies that will not be observed in market economies. The most important of
these factors is that in transition countries policy reforms occurred in a setting where domestic
services sectors were rather embryonic and/or stagnant. The share of services in GDP was
invariably substantially below that observed in market-based economies with similar levels of
industrial development, educational attainment and technical capacity. Reforms to open the
economy, remove price and other controls and to permit entry into services activities triggered
a rapid expansion of service industries with an associated increase in demand for workers in
services sectors. Figure 1 illustrates this feature of the transition process. In the early 1990s
the share of services in total employment in our sample was around 35%, as opposed to 60% on
average in OECD member countries. During the two subsequent decades the share of services in
total employment increased by 70% in our sample, as opposed to only 15% in OECD countries.
4 For a model of these types of effects see Francois (1990).
5 These and similar effects have been discussed by Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006) and Winkler (2010).
6 ‘EECA sample’ refers to the 24 countries in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region covered in our
empirical analysis. See Appendix A for a complete list of such countries. The employment share (% of total
population) series are from the World Bank World Development Indicators. ‘OECD countries’ refers the the
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Figure 1: Services and manufacturing employment shares.6
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Services Manufacturing
Clearly an increase in overall employment in services sectors was a basic feature of the transition
process, reflecting a mix of new entry and investment in services activities and incentives for
manufacturing industries to improve efficiency by outsourcing services. Our interest in what
follows is the effect of services policy reforms on downstream manufacturing employment. While
there are good reasons to expect this to be negative in the initial period of economic transition,
it is possible that manufacturing employment could expand as a result of access to cheaper
and better services inputs following reforms. Conversely, outsourcing of services could lead to a
net reduction in manufacturing employment, complementing transition-specific factors that put
pressure on manufacturing employment. Thus, the net effect of services reforms on downstream
employment is essentially an empirical matter.
3 Empirical model
To estimate the impact of services policy reforms on manufacturing employment we follow an
empirical methodology in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998), who postulate that the degree
of financial dependence across sectors mediates the effect of national financial policies on value
added growth at the sector level. Analogously we posit that the effect of upstream services
reforms on downstream employment is a function of downstream sectors’ use of services inputs.
Consistent with this, we interact services policy indicators that vary at the time and country
level with measures of services input intensity that are manufacturing sector-specific. Summing
across services sectors we obtain a composite reform indicator that varies at the country c,
manufacturing sector i and time t level. This indicator - that is going to be the regressor of
interest in our model - is specified in the following formula
CREFcit =∑
s
REFsct ×wscit (3.1)
World Bank aggregate which covers all OECD economies.
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where REFsct is the policy variable for services sector s in country c and wscit is the measure
of input intensity of services s into manufacturing sector i in country c. For the latter we use
standard input-output technical coefficients. Finally we normalize the composite indicator to
vary between 0 and 1 and we denote the normalized version by crefcit.
This approach allows us to employ an exhaustive battery of fixed effects. Our baseline employ-
ment specification is given by the following equation:
lcit = βcrefcit + ζci + ηct + θit + cit (3.2)
where lcit is the natural logarithm of employment in country c and manufacturing sector i at
time t. While particularly demanding on the data, this specification controls for any observed
or unobserved heterogeneity at the country-sector (ζci), country-time (ηct) and sector-time (θit)
level. In particular, the model accounts for many of the determinants of employment which are
normally used in empirical studies of industry labor demand (Amiti and Wei, 2005, Amiti and
Wei, 2006 and Winkler, 2010). Indeed, shocks to a particular country or sector at any point in
time that affect the supply of labor, the price of intermediate inputs (including wages), output
volumes and production technologies are subsumed in the country-time and industry-time fixed
effects. On top of this, the country-sector fixed effects absorb all the time invariant characteristics
that are idiosyncratic to each single country-sector pair including country-specific endowments
which affect the underlying long-run labor intensity of a country’s sectors and, in turn, their
employment levels.
Following Blonigen (2015), we first-difference the data by country-sector to control for country-
sector fixed effects, as well as to mitigate time-series issues.7 As a result we estimate the empirical
model specified in the following equation:
lcit − lci(t−1) = β[crefcit − crefci(t−1)] + λct + µit + εcit (3.3)
There are several endogeneity concerns that need to be addressed. First, empirical studies
adopting the difference-in-differences methodology pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) need
to avoid the use of country specific input intensity measures becasue services input intensities
in downstream sectors are likely to depend on services regulation itself (the policy treatment).
Moreover, an industrial strategy aiming at employment expansion could potentially imply the
reduction of services outsourcing to boost in house activities. This would cause a problem of
reverse causation from employment levels to the input-output component of our regressor of
interest. The most widely adopted solution to these types of problems is to use a reference
country as a unique source of input-output data, with the underlying assumption that the input-
output linkages in the reference country are a good proxy for technological relationships between
sectors.8 We adopt this standard approach, computing technical coefficients from the mid-1990s
input-output matrix of the United States. We show in Section 5.6 that our results are robust to
7 We estimate standard errors clustered at the country-sector level to make them robust to any remaining
autocorrelation.
8 Examples of relevant papers that adopt and discuss this solution are Rajan and Zingales (1998), Barone
and Cingano (2011), Bourlès et al. (2013) and Beverelli et al. (2015).
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using country-specific coefficients.
Secondly, no fixed-effect solution is available for heterogeneity that has a country-sector-year
nature and that could drive the relationship between employment in manufacturing and the
policies affecting the services sectors. Two potential sources of omitted variable bias are output
and wages. These variables are standard determinants of sectoral labor demand (a component
of our depend variable) and they are likely to reflect shocks that are not only country-time or
sector-time specific (as is the case for other determinants of labor demand as prices or technology
shifters). Additionally they may be correlated with policy reforms in the services sector which can
potentially affect the scale (output) and the labor skill composition (wages) in manufacturing
industries. In order to account for omitted variable sources of endogeneity we augment the
baseline specification with controls capturing the value of output and individual wages at the
country, sector and time level.
Finally, a potential source of reverse causation is lobbying behavior, which may result in linkages
between employment in manufacturing sectors and the policy component of our regressor of
interest. In principle employment may in part reflect the incentives of a given industry in a
country/time period to lobby for policy reforms in the services sector. In a similar empirical
framework to the one used here, Beverelli et al. (2015) use an instrumental variable approach to
show that this potential source of endogeneity is weak and gives rise to negligible estimation biases
when the dependent variable is a measure of productivity. In any event, we believe that lobbying
incentives are more likely to be fixed in the short-run, reflecting long-standing relationships
between the sectors and the political system. While this argument is less compelling in the case
of our sample of transition economies, time varying shocks that originate from changes in the
political system are captured by the country-time fixed effects.
4 Data
We use three distinct sources of information to construct the variables of our baseline specification
(equation 3.2): (i) data on employment and other manufacturing sectors outcomes; (ii) measures
of service sector policy reforms; and (iii) measures of the degree to which different manufacturing
sectors source from the service sectors for which policies are being reformed.
The dependent variable (employment) comes from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics. This dataset
contains information on output, value added, employment and wages for about 20 manufactur-
ing industries per country. We also compute a measure of total factor productivity using this
database.9
The key independent variable of interest (denoted as cref) combines service sector reform indi-
cators with input-output coefficients. The I-O coefficients are obtained from the OECD STAN
9 Output and value added per worker are expressed in nominal terms (current US dollars). Note however
that given that we include sector-year fixed effect we absorb sector-specific changes in prices to the extent that
they are uniform across countries. This appears like a reasonable assumption considering the tradable nature of
the manufacturing sector output. For a similar argument see Rodrik (2013). Our results are robust to the use of
deflated series.
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input-output tables. Unless stated otherwise, we use the mid-1990s US input-output table to
compute the weights for all countries (i.e. we assume wscit = ws,US,i,mid90s for all countries c). As
discussed in Section 3, this practice is widespread in the literature following Rajan and Zingales
(1998). It is motivated by concerns regarding the endogeneity of weights with respect to domes-
tic regulations, and a presumption that the United States economy is relatively undistorted so
that its input-output coefficients are more likely to reflect technological properties of different
manufacturing industries as opposed to the distortive effect of specific service regulations.
The indicators of service reforms are constructed by the EBRD, which has compiled these on
an annual basis since 1989. The indicators are designed to monitor progress in policy reform in
transition economies. They span a number of service sectors: financial services (banking and
non-banking), transport (railways, roads), utilities (water, electricity) and telecommunications.
The indicators take a value ranging between 1 (no progress since 1989) to 4.3 (adoption of
best practices comparable to advanced OECD economies). From this database we construct
policy reform indicators for four services industries, finance, telecommunications, transport and
utilities.10
The left panel of Figure 4 displays the simple average policy index across the four service sectors
and shows substantial variation in the pace of reforms across the 24 countries included in the
estimation sample. While all countries started with similar scores in 1990, some countries such
as Hungary, Poland or Estonia implemented rapid reforms during the 1990s while others such
as Belarus and Ukraine undertook much more modest reforms. On average it appears that
most reforms were implemented during the 1990s, with much more more limited improvements
achieved during the 2000s.
Figure 4: Regulation over time and across countries.11
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In addition to the cross-country variation in the pace and depth of reforms, countries also exhibit
substantial cross-sector variation. This is evident from the right-hand panel in Figure 4, which
reports the standard deviation of the reform indicators across sectors for each country for three
10 Details on the EBRD raw data as well as on the construction of the services specific indicators used in our
analysis are provided in Appendix C.
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different years (note that the standard deviation is zero for many countries in 1990, a year at
which reforms toward a market economy had barely begun for most economies).
Table 1 reports the average annual growth rate in employment across all sample countries for
each sector. While overall employment in manufacturing has declined (as is evident from Figure
1 above), there is a lot of variation across industries within manufacturing. The table confirms
the fact that decline in employment was much stronger during the 1990s than the 2000s. We see
for instance that the motor vehicle industry shrank at a 9% a year during the 1990s but grew
positively over the 2000-2012 period.
Table 1: Average annual growth rate by sector
Period: 1990-2012 1990-1999 2000-2012
Basic metals -2.74 -3.91 -1.91
Chemicals -3.95 -4.94 -3.16
Coke, refined petroleum -1.72 -0.47 -2.85
Communication -0.8 1.27 -1.71
Electrical machinery -3.28 -8.75 0.41
Fabricated metal products -1.07 -7.65 2.99
Food, beverages -1.64 -1.82 -1.52
Machinery and equipment -6.6 -8.43 -4.88
Motor vehicles, trailers -4.29 -9.12 1.06
Other mgf and recycling -4.13 -9.61 -0.01
Other non-metallic prod. -4.75 -7.78 -2.36
Other transport equipment 0.73 2.82 0.47
Precision instruments -5.41 -14.94 0.79
Pulp, paper -0.35 0.08 -0.56
Rubber and plastic products 1.17 -3.87 3.43
Textiles -6.5 -7.41 -5.55
Wood products -2.85 -1.98 -3.36
Across sectors -3.43 -6.12 -1.44
Notes: Based on the estimating sample corresponding to 5,500 (sector-country-year)
observations in 24 countries and 18 sectors over 23 years (1990-2012). Growth rates
computed weighing observations based on their initial employment.
Table 2 reports the mean and standard deviations of the key dependent and explanatory variables
for our estimating sample, both in levels and in first-differences (thus reflecting more accurately
the variation we exploit to estimate our model).
9
Services Policy Reform and Manufacturing Employment: Evidence from Transition Economies
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for dependent variable and main independent variable in first-
differences
Variable Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum
lcit 9.500 2.009 0.693 14.780
crefcit 0.261 0.176 0 1
log outputcit 19.548 2.636 8.889 26.001
log wagescit 7.923 1.258 -1.435 10.698
Var in first diff
lcit -0.025 0.301 -3.989 3.332
crefcit 0.010 0.019 -0.067 0.251
log outputcit 0.088 0.546 -3.601 6.185
log wagescit 0.099 0.466 -5.618 5.963
Notes: Based on the estimating sample corresponding to 5,500 (sector-country-year)
observations in 24 countries and 18 sectors over 23 years (1990-2012).
5 Results
5.1 Main estimation results
Results for the estimation of our baseline model are given in the first column of Table 3. The
coefficient for cref shows that services policy reforms have a negative and statistically significant
effect on downstream employment. This result holds true - with minor changes in magnitude
and within the standard levels of statistical significance - when the specification is augmented
with the log of output (column 2), the log of individual wages (column 3) or both (column 4).
Note that in these cases the signs of the coefficients for output and wages are consistent with the
standard empirical results on labor demand, which is positively associated with production and
negatively associated with the cost of labor.
Table 3: Effect of services reform on manufacturing employment
Dep var: log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cref -0.965** -0.952** -0.931* -0.863* -1.695*** -1.887***
(0.481) (0.457) (0.489) (0.470) (0.600) (0.679)
log output 0.342*** 0.418*** 0.483*** 0.451***
(0.0376) (0.0311) (0.0392) (0.0452)
log wages -0.132*** -0.328*** -0.235*** -0.225***
(0.0426) (0.0543) (0.0477) (0.0514)
log imports -0.0221 -0.00969
(0.0200) (0.0231)
Observations 5500 5500 5500 5500 4449 3222
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.327 0.149 0.405 0.442 0.402
Year coverage 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2012 1990-2007
Notes: All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include country-time and sector-time fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported between brackets.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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As a robustness check, in the last two models reported in Table 3 we augment our preferred
specification of column 4 with imports at the manufacturing sector-country-year level.12 This
additional control is chosen to capture policy reforms that vary across downstream manufacturing
sectors, countries and years. Absent any specific data source for manufacturing sector-specific
reforms for our sample, we use trade developments as a proxy for the more general pattern of
reforms across manufacturing sectors. Given that the structure of import protection implemented
by transition economies under central planning involved extensive use of exchange controls, FX
rationing and quotas as opposed to tariffs, and the limited tariff data availability for the early
transition period, we use import supply (an outcome measure) as a proxy for applied trade policy
in our estimation sample. Note that limited trade data coverage at the industry level, even though
more widely available than tariff protection data, results in a reduction in the estimation sample
of approximately 20% (see column 5). Column 6 further controls for the sector-country-year-
specific policy responses to the global financial crisis by removing the years 2008-2012 from the
estimation sample. In both cases the negative sign of the coefficient for the regressor of interest
is maintained. The magnitude (in negative terms) as well as the statistical significance of the
estimates increase,13 confirming our preference for model 4 as generating conservative estimates
while maximising the size of the estimation sample.
To provide a sense of the economic meaning of our estimates we use the results from our preferred
specification in column (4) to quantitatively assess the employment effect of a pro-competitive
policy change consisting in a one standard deviation increase in each services sector-specific
policy reform index. The downstream effect of a policy shift depends upon the input intensity
coefficients and therefore is specific to each manufacturing sector i. Given that our dependent
variable is expressed in logs, the percentage change in manufacturing sector i′s employment level
resulting from a one standard deviation increase in all services policy measures is computed as:
%∆Li = −0.863 × 100 ×∆crefi (5.1)
where L denotes employment without the log transformation and ∆crefi is the normalized ver-
sion of ∆CREFi = ∑s(σs×wsi), with σs being a standard deviation in the distribution of sector s
policy measures.14 Standard deviations are computed for the country-year pairs in the estimation
sample of Table 3. They are equal to 0.73 for finance and insurance; 0.94 for telecommunica-
tions; 0.75 for transport services; and 0.84 for utilities. These variations represent very common
occurrences in our sample. All countries undergo changes of a one standard deviation in their
reform indicators in all sectors at least once; 11 countries out of 24 go through reforms of twice
12 Import data are from the World Bank WITS database (see Table A-1 in Appendix A). Given the use
of country-time and sector-time fixed effects in the estimation there is no need to correct the import values -
expressed in absolute terms - by scaling them with country or sector level characteristics varying across time.
13 Given that the estimated coefficients for the log of imports are not statistically significant, the increase in
the magnitude and statistical significance of the cref coefficients may be largely driven by the changes in the
estimation sample.
14 In order to derive ∆crefi we proceed as follows. First we compute CREFσcit = ∑s(REFsct + σs) × wsi. As
in the case of CREF , the input-output technical coefficients are taken from a reference country (the US) and a
reference period (mid 90s). Then we normalise this quantity using the minimum and maximum value of CREFcit
to obtain crefσcit. Finally we subtract crefcit from crefσcit. The resulting difference, denoted by ∆crefi varies only
at the manufacturing sector level and represents - in the normalised scale of crefi - the increase by one standard
deviation in the policy reform variables.
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this magnitude. Standing out in the sample, Czech Republic and Estonia implemented reforms
of 3 times this magnitude.
As shown in Table 4, the employment effect of the hypothesised reform results in a -4.16%
decline in the downstream sector with the lowest average services input intensity (manufacturing
of office, accounting and computer machinery). The policy change is associated with a -18.90%
reduction in employment level for the downstream sector with the highest average requirement
of services intermediates (manufacturing of non-metallic mineral products).
Table 4: Effect of one standard deviation increase in the reform indicator by manufacturing
sector
Manufacturing sector (ISIC rev.3) %∆L
Office, accounting and computing machinery (30) -4.16
Radio, television and communication equipment (32) -4.63
Medical, precision and optical instruments (33) -5.41
Other transport equipment (35) -5.92
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c (31) -6.01
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34) -6.17
Machinery and equipment n.e.c (29) -6.30
Food products, beverages and tobacco (15,16) -6.89
Manufacturing n.e.c; recycling (36,37) -6.94
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear (17-19) -7.02
Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment (28) -7.69
Wood and products of wood and cork (20) -8.20
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing (21,22) -9.58
Rubber and plastics products (25) -11.13
Chemicals and chemical products (24) -11.25
Basic metals (27) -12.92
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (23) -18.53
Other non-metallic mineral products (26) -18.90
Notes: ISIC rev.3, 2 digits classification in parenthesis.
5.2 Heterogeneous effects across country groups and time periods
5.2.1 Economic governance and human capital
We now exploit the country-level heterogeneity in our sample to analyze whether and how the
negative effect found in Section 5.1 changes when computed over subsamples defined in terms
of relevant country-level characteristics. In particular we are interested in investigating the role
of broad indicators of economic governance as well as human capital at the country level in
influencing the downstream employment impacts of services policy reforms.
In principle, the role of governance institutions in shaping the employment effect of services
reforms is ambiguous. On the one hand good institutions (high regulatory quality, control of
corruption and rule of law) may support more rapid firm level adjustment to policy reforms.
Good institutions can allow firms to substitute in-house activities with more efficient services
coming from a reformed sector, minimising rigidities due to contractual inefficiencies or the
need to confront distortionary special interests. Moreover, good institutions may permit a more
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rapid response of the services sector itself, enhancing the capacity to absorb workers from the
adjusting downstream sectors. If so, such mechanisms may reduce the social costs of adjustment
by manufacturing industries (a ‘substitution’ effect of economic governance). On the other hand,
good institutions may complement policy reforms by helping to attract better quality services
(and services providers) into the country (see Beverelli et al., 2015). More efficient services inputs
are likely to help domestic manufacturing to specialize and expand the scale of production.15
This would result in a positive employment effect of services reforms (a ‘scale’ effect of economic
governance).
Turning to the role of human capital, if - as suggested by recent empirical studies of services
offshoring16 - a reform-induced expansion in access to efficient producer services triggers a pattern
of skill upgrading at the firm and industry level, reforming countries with more skilled labor
(higher human capital) may be able to better match this increase in demand for skilled labor, with
a direct positive effect on manufacturing employment. This in turn would support specialisation
and scale effects that expand labor demand. Overall, high human capital endowments therefore
should be associated with a positive effect of services reforms on employment.
As measures of economic governance we use three variables reported in the Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators Database (World Bank), i.e. regulatory quality, control of corruption and rule
of law.17 As a proxy for human capital we take the gross enrolment ratio in secondary education
for both sexes from the World Development Indicators (World Bank). For each moderating vari-
able m we divide the estimation sample into two subsamples and compute the country-specific
average of m across available years, obtaining the variable m¯. We then divide all countries in
two quantiles (LOW and HIGH), below and above the sample median of m¯. For each subsample
we estimate both the baseline specification and (for robustness purposes) the baseline model
augmented with output and wages. Table 5 present the results.
With respect to the full-sample results (Table 3), the negative employment effect of services
reforms appears stronger when estimated for those countries with a lower level of economic
governance or human capital (LOW quantile of the m¯ distribution). It is also always statistically
different from 0 at least at a 10% significance level. This result is robust to the inclusion of output
and wages as additional controls. Conversely, when estimated for the subsamples corresponding
to the high governance or high human capital countries (HIGH quantile of the m¯ distribution),
the effect of services reforms is attenuated in both its magnitude and statistical significance. In
particular, the coefficient of cref is always smaller (in negative terms) than the corresponding
full-sample estimation and it is statistically different from 0 only for the baseline specification
in the case when the moderating variable is the rule of law indicator (column 3 in Panel B).
These results suggest that both high levels of economic governance and human capital reduce
the negative effect of services policy reforms on manufacturing employment.
The transition economies in our sample comprise two groups, with one set of countries having
gone through a process of accession to the EU and another that has not. The set of reforms
15 See Francois (1990).
16 See for instance Geishecker and Görg (2013).
17 Data on these variables are available for all 24 EBRD countries in our sample for the following years: 1996,
1998, 2000, and 2002-2012.
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Table 5: Effect of services reform on manufacturing employment at different levels of economic
governance and human capital
Panel A m = regulatory quality m = control of corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cref -2.338* -2.363** -0.598 -0.642 -2.354* -2.399** -0.524 -0.563
(1.269) (1.194) (0.395) (0.440) (1.272) (1.196) (0.395) (0.431)
log output 0.356*** 0.573*** 0.357*** 0.572***
(0.0310) (0.0563) (0.0310) (0.0562)
log wages -0.323*** -0.196** -0.323*** -0.197**
(0.0545) (0.0863) (0.0548) (0.0860)
Observations 2490 2490 3004 3004 2475 2475 3019 3019
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.341 0.225 0.561 0.103 0.342 0.225 0.560
m¯ quantile LOW LOW HIGH HIGH LOW LOW HIGH HIGH
Panel B m = rule of law m = human capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cref -2.570* -2.737** -0.782* -0.527 -1.674* -1.552* -0.632 -0.167
(1.315) (1.202) (0.416) (0.468) (0.900) (0.880) (0.569) (0.470)
log output 0.344*** 0.496*** 0.379*** 0.478***
(0.0333) (0.0451) (0.0309) (0.0628)
log wages -0.192*** -0.455*** -0.311*** -0.302***
(0.0505) (0.0741) (0.0584) (0.0858)
Observations 2241 2241 3243 3243 2364 2364 3110 3110
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.323 0.219 0.534 0.135 0.373 0.147 0.462
m¯ quantile LOW LOW HIGH HIGH LOW LOW HIGH HIGH
Notes: Dependent variable always equal to log employment. All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and
include country-time and sector-time fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
required for integration into the EU is in large part designed to bring the institutional environ-
ment of a country closer to EU norms and standards for a wide range of policy areas, including
the judiciary, the civil service (bureaucratic efficiency) and the enforcement of competition pol-
icy. A priori, accession countries should be characterised by better governance and institutions
than non-accession countries, with ambiguous implications for the the impact on the downstream
manufacturing employment (as discussed above). Replicating the estimation of the baseline and
augmented model on the subsample of countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 we find that
the effect of services policy reforms on downstream manufacturing employment, while still neg-
ative and significant for the countries that did not join the EU in 2004, becomes statistically
non-different from zero in accession countries.18 Table 6 presents the results. The policy reforms
implied by accession to the EU (for those joining in 2004) are associated with a smaller negative
effect on downstream manufacturing employment (columns 3 and 4). This finding is in line with
the results from considering the role of economic governance as measured by the indicators of
18 The countries that joined the EU in 2004 are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia. Including in the accession group the countries that joined the EU in subsequent stages,
i.e. Bulgaria (2007), Croatia (2013) and Romania (2007), does not change the results.
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regulatory quality, control of corruption and rule of law.
Table 6: Effect of services reform on manufacturing employment in 2004 EU accession countries
2004 accession: No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cref -1.525* -1.389* -0.959 -0.601
(0.843) (0.803) (0.796) (0.699)
log output 0.352*** 0.606***
(0.0311) (0.0616)
log wages -0.298*** -0.370**
(0.0535) (0.152)
Observations 3228 3228 2269 2269
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.326 0.206 0.631
Notes: Dependent variable always equal to log employment. All models
are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include country-time
and sector-time fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported
between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
5.2.2 Stages of the transition process
An important factor that may have an impact on the estimation of the effect of services reforms
on downstream employment is the general transition process in the economies in our sample. In
particular, it is reasonable to assume that the initial stages of the transition processes involving
large scale changes in the economic environment will swamp any potential positive downstream
scale effect from access to (more) efficient services inputs. As has been documented in the
literature, transition economies underwent “transformational recessions” (Kornai, 1994; da Rocha,
2015) that were associated with the breakdown of long-standing relationships and inter-sectoral
linkages. If we replicate the analysis by estimating our model separately for the first and second
half of the 23 years of our sample, we find that the negative effect of services reform is associated
with the early stages of transition.19
Table 7 presents estimates for both the baseline equation and the model augmented with output
and wages. In the two models corresponding to the first half of our sample (columns 1 and 2 of
Table 7), the coefficient of the composite reform indicator is negative, statistically significant and
slightly larger in size than is the case using the full-sample. For the second half of the sample
period (columns 3 and 4) the coefficient remains negative but is smaller in magnitude and loses
statistical significance.
5.3 Heterogeneity across services sectors
We now relax the assumption, implicit in the construction of our composite reform indicator in
(3.1), that the impact of policy reforms is homogeneous across services sectors. To do so we
define four sector specific variables as the product of the sector specific policy reform indicator
19 Setting the beginning of the second half at the year 2001 or 2002 does not affect the results.
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Table 7: Effect of services reform on manufacturing employment in different time periods
Period: 1990-2001 2002-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cref -1.098* -1.095** -0.411 -0.138
(0.572) (0.541) (0.913) (0.867)
log output 0.418*** 0.426***
(0.0455) (0.0442)
log wages -0.247*** -0.391***
(0.0549) (0.0759)
Observations 2357 2357 3143 3143
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.402 0.120 0.403
Notes: Dependent variable always equal to log employment. All mod-
els are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include country-
time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at the country-sector level are reported between brackets.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
with the corresponding vector of input-output weights. Formally, for each services sector s we
define
crefscit = REFsct ×wsi (5.2)
Columns 1-4 of Table 8 report the estimation results when each of these sector-specific indicators
is used to replace the aggregate variable cref .
Table 8: Heterogeneity across services sectors and the role of utilities
Dep var: log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
crefutilities -0.832*
(0.481)
creftranport -0.353
(0.291)
creftelecom 0.0596
(0.238)
creffinance 0.118
(1.018)
cref w/out utilities -0.367
(0.339)
Control for output and wages Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5500 5500 5500 5500 5500
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.405 0.405 0.405 0.405
Notes: All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include country-time and
sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported
between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The only sector-specific policy reform indicator for which the estimated coefficient remains signif-
icantly negative is that of utilities (column 1). For transport services (in column 2) the magnitude
of the estimate is reduced (in negative terms) and statistical significance is absent at the stan-
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dard levels. Moving to telecommunication (column 3) and financial services (column 4) the sign
of the coefficient becomes positive even though not statistically significant. To further explore
the role of utilities we construct a version of cref that accounts only for reforms in transport,
telecommunications and financial services. The last column of Table 8 shows that when utilities
are excluded from the construction of the aggregate composite reform indicator the magnitude
of the estimated coefficient is reduced by more than a half with respect to its value in Table 3
and statistical significance decreases below the 10% threshold.
The results presented in Table 8 suggest that policy reforms targeting electricity, water and
waste water related services (utilities) are particularly important for the negative downstream
employment effect of services reforms. These are sectors where low values of the EBRD reform
indicator reflect monopoly/State ownership and therefore most likely non cost-reflective tariffs
(prices), cross-subsidization and soft budget constraints. As a result, policy reforms to introduce
commercial pressures may increase services input costs for downstream manufacturing sectors
(see Gray, 1995; Freund and Wallich, 1997; Stern and Davis, 1998, for detailed discussions of
utilities markets reforms in transition economies).20 These results suggest that the overall nega-
tive impact on downstream employment is likely to be partly driven by the effects of reforms in
the utilities sector on energy-intensive manufacturing sectors.
5.4 Lagged effects of services reforms
In this section we investigate the linkages between services reforms and manufacturing employ-
ment beyond the instantaneous impact estimated in Table 3. It is plausible that such inter-
sectoral relationships - from upstream producer services to downstream manufacturing employ-
ment - would be active and evolve for more than one year. In order to test for the existence of
non-contemporaneous effects of service reforms on downstream employment we include several
lags of cref . Table 9 presents the results. The point estimates are negative for the contempora-
neous change and the first lag and then turn positive. This suggests that the cumulated effect
over time might be less negative than what our previous estimates suggested. However we note
that the coefficients on lag values are very imprecisely estimated and always associated with
p-values above 10%. We also remark that the contemporaneous effect becomes more negative
when the lag values are included and that it remains rather stable, showing that the coefficient
is robust to the inclusion of lags. Overall we find little support for the notion that longer run
effects of policy reforms offset short-run negative impacts on manufacturing employment.
20 While consistent time series data for energy producer prices in our sample of countries are not available
before 2007, non-systematic evidence reported in various EBRD Transition Reports reveals a pattern of rising
energy and utility prices associated with transition. EBRD (1996) notes that energy prices charged to producers
in 1994 were relatively close to those in the EU for those economies that were already at an advanced stage
of transition (primarily Eastern European countries and the Baltics), while they remained significantly lower in
countries that were still at an early stage of transition (mainly CIS countries).
17
Services Policy Reform and Manufacturing Employment: Evidence from Transition Economies
Table 9: Lagged effects of reforms
Dep var: log employment
(1) (2)
cref -1.419** -1.119**
(0.573) (0.551)
cref(t − 1) -0.155 -0.379
(0.536) (0.483)
cref(t − 2) 0.174 0.382
(0.443) (0.444)
cref(t − 3) 0.142 0.514
(0.412) (0.351)
Control for output and wages No Yes
Observations 5113 5113
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.405
Notes: All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and in-
clude country-time and sector-time fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are reported
between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
5.5 Services reforms and productivity
A negative effect on manufacturing employment is consistent with the general result found in
the literature cited previously that restrictive services trade policies have adverse effects on
productivity of downstream firms and industries. To put our negative employment finding into
context, we assess the effect of services reforms on manufacturing productivity in our sample of
countries. We rely on the baseline model specified in (3.2) using a measure of productivity as
dependent variable. The main potential sources of endogeneity are, mutatis mutandis, analogous
to those discussed in Section 3. While we continue to use the US I-O coefficients to generate
input intensity measures to minimise reverse causality issues, we do not include any additional
control varying at the country-sector-time level. Our assumption is that the relevant variation
in the key determinants of productivity such as R&D intensity is driven by either long-run
characteristics (factor endowments, economic geography) or by shocks at the country or industry
level (technology, political economy dynamics, etc.) and, therefore, is controlled for by the fixed
effects.21
Our first measure of productivity is the natural logarithm of value added per employee (labor
productivity). This measure has the advantage of limiting the extent to which the sample
size is reduced (a decrease in the number of observations of some 20%). However, as this is
a rather rough and limited proxy for productivity, we also construct a measure of total factor
productivity (TFP) using standard accounting techniques. We use a Cobb-Douglas model, such
21 The validity of this identification strategy is confirmed by the stability of the estimates for the employment
model when moving from the baseline specification to that featuring country-sector-time controls (log output and
log wages). A similar approach is adopted in Blonigen (2015) who uses a less demanding version of this empirical
model (not including sector-time fixed effects) to investigate the impact of industrial policy in the steel sector on
downstream sectors export competitiveness.
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that logTFPcit = logV Acit − a logLcit − (1 − a) logKcit, where V A denotes real value added;22
a is the sectoral share parameter set equal to 2/3 (as in Cipollina et al., 2012); L and K are
respectively employment and the real capital stock. Following Levchenko et al. (2009), the series
for capital is constructed using the standard inventory method, where the capital stock in year
t is given by Kcit = (1− d)Kci(t−1) + Icit with I real investment, the depreciation rate d set equal
to 0.08 and the initial level of capital stock given by Kci0 = Ici0/d.23 The resulting TFP measure
improves upon value added per worker as proxy for productivity. However it entails a significant
reduction in the size of the estimation sample.24
The results reported in Table 10 indicate a positive effect of services sector reforms on downstream
productivity. The magnitude of the positive coefficient in the model for labor productivity
(column 1 of Table 10) is about twice that of the negative coefficient in the employment model
(Table 3, column 4). This no doubt reflects a mechanical increase in labor productivity that is
the counterpart of the reduction in the level of employment.
Table 10: Effect of services reform on manufacturing productivity
Dep var: log labor prod log TFP
(1) (2)
cref 1.796*** 0.690**
(0.675) (0.347)
Observations 4420 2198
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.128
Notes: All models are estimated in country-sector first-
differences and include country-time and sector-time
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the
country-sector level are reported between brackets.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The positive sign and the statistical significance of the productivity effect is confirmed by the
estimated cref coefficient in the TFP model (Table 10, column 2).25 The magnitude of this coef-
ficient implies a sector-specific increase in TFP, following an increase by one standard deviation
in all services reform indicators, from 3.33% to 15.11%. The complete list of TFP effects is given
in Table 11.
More generally, these results suggest that, even if services reforms do not trigger a net increase in
employment in manufacturing sectors, downstream manufacturing productivity unambiguously
benefits from pro competitive policy reforms in producer service sectors.
22 Real value added is obtained by deflating the UNIDO value added series in US dollars by the (output-side)
price level for the US with reference year equal to 2005. We use price data from the Penn World Table, version
8.1 (see Feenstra et al., 2015).
23 As in Beverelli et al. (2015) we take Ici0 as the first non-missing datapoint in the real investment series
starting from the 1960s. The series of real investment is constructed by deflating the UNIDO investment series
with the (capital formation) price levels reported in the Penn World Table, version 8.1.
24 This is due to the limited coverage of investment data for the countries and sectors in our sample.
25 Beverelli et al. (2015) show that the quality of governance institutions impacts on the downstream produc-
tivity effects of services trade policy. The estimation sample for model 2 in Table 10 covers 17 countries including
some with weak or fragile governance institutions such as Albania, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Mongolia. This makes
the positive effect result fairly general and not completely driven by the average quality of economic governance
in the subsample.
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Table 11: TFP effect of one standard deviation increase in the reform indicator by manufacturing
sector
Manufacturing sector (ISIC rev.3) %∆TFP
Office, accounting and computing machinery (30) 3.33
Radio, television and communication equipment (32) 3.70
Medical, precision and optical instruments (33) 4.32
Other transport equipment (35) 4.73
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c (31) 4.81
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34) 4.93
Machinery and equipment n.e.c (29) 5.04
Food products, beverages and tobacco (15,16) 5.51
Manufacturing n.e.c; recycling (36,37) 5.55
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear (17-19) 5.61
Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment (28) 6.15
Wood and products of wood and cork (20) 6.56
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing (21,22) 7.66
Rubber and plastics products (25) 8.90
Chemicals and chemical products (24) 8.99
Basic metals (27) 10.33
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (23) 14.82
Other non-metallic mineral products (26) 15.11
Notes: ISIC rev.3, 2 digits classification in parenthesis.
5.6 Further robustness checks
The robustness of the negative employment effect of our composite services reform indicator
to alternative measures of services input intensity can be assessed by replacing the US I-O
coefficients with coefficients derived from the US Leontief inverse matrix. These capture, beyond
the direct upstream-downstream connections, also the set of indirect relationships linking two
sectors at any position in the supply chain.26 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 12 show that taking these
indirect linkages into account still results in a negative and statistically significant coefficient for
the composite reform index cref . This holds for both our baseline specification and the model
augmented with output and wages. The use of Leontief coefficients increases the magnitude of
the estimates by between 50 and 75% compared to those reported in Table 3. This is consistent
with a higher degree of input intensity (both direct and indirect) embedded in the Leontief
weights.
To assess the validity of our identification assumption about the representativeness of US social
accounting matrix and its capacity to capture the technological linkages between sectors rather
than US-specific shocks we build an alternative version of the composite reform indicator using
input-output coefficients derived from country-specific social accounting matrices. Conditioning
on data availability limitations which significantly reduce the estimation sample,27 the estimates
in columns 3-6 of Table 12 confirm the negative and statistically significant employment effect
of services reforms. This holds across both specifications and types of input-output coefficients.
26 See Appendix B for the derivation of different input-output coefficients.
27 Country-specific matrices from OECD STAN database are available for only 11 of the 24 countries in our
full sample: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Turkey. We choose the mid 2000s as a reference period to maximize country coverage.
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The magnitude of the effects is consistent with the estimates using US as a reference country: in
case of the specification with output and wages, the use of country-specific weights increases (in
negative terms) the coefficient on cref by 15%.
Table 12: Alternative services input intensity measures
IO weights in cref : US leontief country specific (tech) country specific (leont)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cref -1.473** -1.532** -1.306*** -1.014*** -1.360*** -1.424***
(0.696) (0.662) (0.363) (0.312) (0.486) (0.481)
log ouput 0.418*** 0.577*** 0.578***
(0.0311) (0.0569) (0.0568)
log wages -0.328*** -0.194** -0.194**
(0.0543) (0.0877) (0.0876)
Observations 5500 5500 2959 2959 2959 2959
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.406 0.222 0.562 0.222 0.562
Notes: Dependent variable always equal to log employment. All models are estimated in country-sector first-differences
and include country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are
reported between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Finally, to check whether our baseline results reflect the excessive influence of the country with
the highest or lowest average policy reform value across services sectors (respectively Estonia and
Bosnia Herzegovina) we alternatively exclude these countries from the estimation sample and
assess how the resulting coefficients are affected. We replicate this exercise excluding one-by-one
the sectors with the highest and lowest average value of services input use intensity (respectively
manufacturing of non metallic mineral products - ISIC code 26 - and manufacturing of office,
accounting and computing machinery, ISIC code 30). As shown in Table 13, the coefficients are
robust to the exclusion of these extreme cases, that is, they remain negative and significant at
the 5% level.
Table 13: Influential observations
Omitting influential countries sectors
(1) (2)
cref -0.964** -1.438**
(0.475) (0.659)
Control for output and wage Yes Yes
Observations 5290 4883
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.429
Notes: Dependent variable always equal to log employment. All
models are estimated in country-sector first-differences and include
country-time and sector-time fixed effects. Influential countries are
defined as those with the highest and lowest average value of pol-
icy reform indicators across services sectors (respectively Estonia
and Bosnia Herzegovina). Influential sectors are defined as those
with the highest and lowest average value of services input intensity
across services sectors (respectively manufacturing of non metallic
mineral products - ISIC code 26 - and manufacturing of office, ac-
counting and computing machinery, ISIC code 30).
Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level are re-
ported between brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyze the effect of services policy reforms on downstream employment in
manufacturing. This is a subject of general interest that has not been the focus of much cross-
country empirical research, in part because of lack of time series data on applied service sector
policies for many countries. The performance of services sectors can have a significant impact
on industries that use services as intermediate inputs. Our results complement the literature
identifying positive productivity effects of pro-competitive services policy reforms by document-
ing the existence of a negative relationship between services policy reforms that move countries
towards what are regarded to be best practices and employment in downstream manufacturing
industries. We also find that the negative effect on manufacturing employment is mitigated or
disappears for countries with high levels of economic governance and human capital, pointing to
the importance of the broader business environment and investment climate in moderating the
impacts of services policy reforms.
Our analysis is based on a panel of sector-level data for 24 transition economies for the 1990-2012
period. The focus on these countries is motivated in large part by the availability of annual time
series data on applied services policies. The transition economies that are the focus of analysis
are in many ways exceptional, but for our purposes a key feature of these countries is that the
EBRD has been compiling services sector-specific policy indicators for over two decades. While
this has benefits in permitting the use of a large battery of fixed effects, which in principle should
do much to control for the idiosyncratic features of these countries, the potential downside is
that our results, notwithstanding the controls, may not have general validity.
Whatever the case may be in this regard, our results suggest that services policy reforms are one
factor explaining the declining share of manufacturing that occurred in the transition economies.
Overall service sector employment grew rapidly following the demise of central planning. This
structural transformation of the transition economies is not surprising, of course, given the
distorted initial conditions that prevailed in these countries. Employment statistics for these
countries show that the share of total employment in manufacturing initially declined for the
group as a whole, and then gradually increased (see Figure 1 above). Moving towards best prac-
tice services policies was associated with an economically significant reduction of manufacturing
employment, helping to explain the observed trend in sectoral employment shares. Our results
suggest that at the aggregate level the potential positive scale effect of better access to services
for downstream manufacturing industries is more than offset by incentives to outsource non-core
tasks and the associated reduction in the workforce employed in manufacturing.
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Appendices
A Appendix tables
Table A-1: Variables used in the empirical analysis
Variable Description and source
Country - manufacturing sector - time level
CREFcit Composite reform indicator. It captures the exposure of manufacturing sector i in
country c at time t to the policy reforms targeting services sectors in country c at
time t. Variable defined in equation (3.1). Source: policy reform data from Tran-
sition Indicators Database, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD). Input intensity data from US IO Table (mid 1990s) from OECD STAN
IO Database
crefcit Normalised version of CREFcit, varying between 0 and 1. It is computed as
crefcit = (CREFcit −min{CREFcit})/(max{CREFcit} −min{CREFcit})
lcit Log of employment in manufacturing sector i in country c at time t. Version
without log denoted with L. Source: UNIDO INDSTAT4, Rev. 3.
log outputcit Log of output in manufacturing sector i in country c at time t. Output expressed
in current USD. Source: UNIDO INDSTAT4, Rev. 3.
logwagescit Log of individual wages in manufacturing sector i in country c at time t. Wages
expressed in current USD. Source: UNIDO INDSTAT4, Rev. 3.
log importscit Log of gross imports of manufacturing sector i in country c at time t. Imports
expressed in current USD (thousands). Source: World Bank WITS.
ycit Log of labor productivity (value added per worker) in manufacturing sector i in
country c at time t. Value added expressed in current USD. Source: UNIDO
INDSTAT4, Rev. 3.
logTFPcit Log of total factor productivity in manufacturing sector i in country c at time
t. logTFPcit is defined in Section 5.5. Source: value added, total employment,
investment from UNIDO INDSTAT4, Rev. 3. Prices from Penn World Table 8.1
Services sector - country - manufacturing sector level
wsci,mid2000s Input intensity of services s into manufacturing sector i. It is equal to the corre-
sponding technical coefficient from the input-output matrix of country c for the
mid 2000s. Alternative measures (Leontief coefficients) are described in Appendix
B. Source: OECD STAN IO Database.
Country - services sector - time level
REFsct Policy reform indicator for services sector s in country c at time t. For detailed
construction of the variable see Section 4. Source: Transition Indicator Database,
EBRD.
Manufacturing sector - services sector level
ws,US,i,mid90s Input intensity of services s into manufacturing sector i. In the benchmark esti-
mation it is equal to the corresponding technical coefficient from the US input-
output matrix for the mid 1990s. Alternative measures are described in Appendix
B. Source: OECD STAN IO Database.
Country level
m¯c Variable used to divide the sample in Section 5.2. It is constructed as the average
across time of mct which, case by case, captures the quality of one governance in-
stitution (either regulatory quality, rule of law or control of corruption) or human
capital measured as the gross enrolment ratio in secondary education (average
across both sexes). Source: Governance Institutions from the Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicator, World Bank. Human capital fromWorld Development Indicators,
World Bank
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Table A-2: Countries and sectors in the empirical analysis
Countries Sectors
Albania Latvia 15-16 31
Azerbaijan Lithuania 17-19 32
Belarus Mongolia 20 33
Bosnia and Herzegovina Poland 21-22 34
Bulgaria Republic of Moldova 23 35
Croatia Romania 24 36-37
Czech Republic Russian Federation 25
Estonia Slovakia 26
Georgia Slovenia 27
Hungary Republic of Macedonia 28
Kazakhstan Turkey 29
Kyrgyzstan Ukraine 30
Notes: Sector numbers follow ISIC Rev. 3, 2 digits classification
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B Input-output coefficients
Technical coefficients
Technical coefficients are derived from the intermediate demand matrix M (the first quadrant
of a social accounting matrix). M is a square matrix of dimension n where rows – indexed by
r – are the supplying industries (domestic and international) and the columns – k – the using
(domestic) industries. The number of industries in M is equal to n. A generic element mrk
of M represents the cost borne by sector k for the output produced by sector r (as domestic
production plus imported foreign production) and used as intermediate input into k. Technical
coefficients are the elements of the square matrix A, defined as:
A ≡ YM (B-1)
where Y is an n-dimension square matrix where the main diagonal includes the inverse output
of each industry and all the other elements are equal to zero. For each services-manufacturing
sector pair (s, i), the technical coefficient is given by the element asi of matrix A and it measures
the cost of the intermediate inputs from services sector s for one dollar of total production of
manufacturing sector i.
Leontief coefficients
The alternative measures of input intensity used in the paper are the coefficients derived from
the Leontief inverse matrix. The input intensity of services sector s into manufacturing sector
i that takes into account all the indirect linkages between the (upstream) supplying and the
(downstream) using sector is given by the element lsi of matrix L, defined as:
L ≡ V B (B-2)
where V is a dimension n square matrix of zeros, except along the main diagonal, that includes
the value added-output ratios of each industry. B is the Leontief inverse (I−A)−1, with A defined
in equation (B-1) above.
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C Description of the EBRD reform indicators and the indepen-
dent variables
The index ranges from 1 (almost no progress in comparison with a socialist economy) to 4.3
(most advanced implementation of reform agenda) and has been document annually over the
1990–2012 period by the EBRD’s chief economist office. Below, we provide a description of the
underlying data and how we aggregate them to compute our independent variable.28
In order to combine the EBRD database with the OECD STAN data where industries are
classified according ISIC rev. 3 (2 digits) we apply the following mapping from EBRD sectors
to ISIC: finance to sectors 65, 66 and 67; telecommunications to sector 64; transports to sectors
60,61,62 and 63; utilities to 40 and 41.
We proceed to some aggregations of the different reforms indicators in order to map them to
the ISIC rev. 3 classification. The aggregation and the different original indicators are detailed
below:
1. Finance: Our indicators is the simple average of the banking and non-banking reform
indicators.
• Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation: 1 corresponds to minimum progress
beyond establishment of a two-tier system; 4.3 corresponds to full convergence of
banking laws and regulations with BIS standards.
• Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions: 1 corresponds to minimum
progress; 4.3 corresponds to full convergence of securities laws and regulations with
IOSCO standards.
2. Telecommunications: Our indicator is equal to the original one provided by EBRD:
• Telecommunications: 1 implies that there has been little progress in commercialisa-
tion and regulation (minimal private sector involvement, strong political interference
in management decisions, low tariffs, with extensive cross-subsidisation etc.); 4.3 cor-
responds to an effective regulation through an independent entity.
3. Transports: Our indicator is the simple average of the railways and roads reform indicators.
• Railways: 1 corresponds to a situation where railways are managed by a monolithic
government structure, with few commercial freedoms and no private sector involve-
ment and extensive cross-subsidisation; 4.3 corresponds to railways fully being com-
mercialised, with separate internal profit centres for freight and passenger services and
involvement of private companies in the freight business and maintenance.
• Roads: 1 corresponds to minimal degree of decentralisation and no commercialisa-
tion. All regulatory, road management and resource allocation functions centralised
at ministerial level; 4.3 corresponds to a fully decentralization with road maintenance
competitively awarded to private companies.
4. Utilities: Our indicator is the simple average of the electricity and water reform indicators.
• Electricity: 1 corresponds to the power sector operating as government department,
with little competitive pressure; 4.3 corresponds to tariffs being driven by costs and
providing adequate incentives for efficiency improvements.
28 Description of the underlying data comes from the EBRD’s website:
http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395237866249&d=&pagename=EBRD%2FContent%2FContentLayout
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• Water: 1 corresponds to minimal degree of decentralisation and no commercialisation
with no financial autonomy capacity at municipal level; 4.3 implies that water utilities
fully decentralised and commercialised.
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